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INTRODUCTION
An examination of proper venue in patent infringement actions
essentially requires an inquisition into the role of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.1 In the United
States, in addition to pertinent statutory law, (1) substantive patent
law is consistently governed by the laws of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme
Court, and (2) procedural law applicable to patent litigation is
uniformly governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
However, local rules of procedure, both in general and specific to
patent litigation, result in procedural distinctions among federal
district courts.3
By adopting a series of plaintiff-friendly rules, the Eastern
District of Texas became notorious for speedy patent litigation
beneficial to plaintiffs.4 Judge T. John Ward, in 2001, adopted
patent rules favorable for plaintiffs, which were later adopted by
the entire Eastern District of Texas in 2005.5 Benefits to plaintiffs
included predictability and uniformity brought by the rules, quick
advancement to trial, large patent infringement damage awards,
and economic benefits to the nearby localities.6 Forum shopping
for district courts such as this one, according to Judge Moore of the
Federal Circuit, is critical to the outcome of the litigation, as the
party filing the suit and selecting the forum is indicative of the
outcome of the litigation.7 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods
Group Brands LLC, however, has significantly limited the choice
of forum in patent litigation through the adoption of a restrictive
interpretation of the applicable patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b).8
1

See J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the
Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1574 (2018).
2
See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631,
642–43 (2015).
3
Id.
4
See id. at 651–53.
5
See id.
6
See id. at 653–54.
7
See id. at 650.
8
See generally Jamie McDole et al., Venue Options for Patent Owners After TC
Heartland and In re Cray, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com
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This Note, in four parts, will (1) survey the current rules
governing venue in patent infringement actions and post-TC
Heartland motions to dismiss or transfer on the basis of improper
venue in accordance with such rules and (2) deduce trends in the
outcomes of such motions. Part I provides a comprehensive
examination of the historical and current laws concerning venue in
patent infringement actions. Part II addresses issues that arise
directly from the interpretation of the venue statute specific to
patent infringement actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), through an
overview of applicable law and an analysis of pertinent motion
outcomes. Part III discusses disputes that arise over venue in patent
infringement actions beyond the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), also
through an overview of applicable law and an exploration of
motion outcomes. Part IV provides a consolidated explanation of
the trends in venue analysis in patent infringement actions with
respect to individual issues. It then suggests that the recent
decision of the Federal Circuit in In re ZTE (USA) Inc.9 to place
the burden of proof on plaintiffs in such motions will lead to
frequent victories for defendants and proposes possible strategies
for plaintiffs to combat defendants’ likely success.
I. PATENT VENUE LAWS FROM 1789 TO 2017
The basic procedural requirements for properly filing a patent
infringement suit in federal court are subject matter jurisdiction,
personal jurisdiction, and venue.10 Section A describes the history
of the venue requirement prior to TC Heartland, while Section B
lays out how TC Heartland has altered the world of patent
litigation.
A. Pre-TC Heartland
The history of the venue requirement begins with Section 11 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which stated that “no civil suit in a
/2017/12/19/venue-options-patent-owners-tc-heartland-re-cray/id=91320/
[https://perma.cc/Y6KZ-US5R] (explaining the impact of TC Heartland on patent
infringement actions).
9
890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
10
8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02 (2018).
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Circuit or District Court shall be brought against an inhabitant of
the United States by any original process in any other district than
that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at
the time of serving the writ.”11 This statutory provision served to
jointly set forth the requirements for both personal jurisdiction and
venue.12 Then, in Chaffee v. Hayward,13 the Supreme Court held
that this statutory provision applied to all civil suits, including
patent suits.14 The Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875
subsequently altered the “against an inhabitant” language of the
1789 Act to instead read “against any person.”15 Section 373 of the
Act of 1887 then provided:
no civil suit shall be brought before either of said
courts [circuit or district courts] against any person
by any original process of proceeding in any other
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but
where the other jurisdiction is founded only on the
fact that the action is between citizens of different
States, suit shall be brought only in the district of
the residence of either the plaintiff or the
defendant. . . .16
While this provision first noted the distinction between federal
question jurisdiction and federal diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court in In re Hohorst17 also found that the relevant provision of
the Act of 1887 did not apply to non-resident aliens, which gave
rise to a split as to whether the statutory provision limited proper
patent venue in the United States to domestic defendants.18 The
next relevant statutory innovation, the 1897 Act, broadened
permissible patent venue to the district that the defendant inhabited
or the district in which the defendant committed acts of

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id. § 21.02(2)(a).
See id.
61 U.S. 208 (1858).
See id. at 216; see also CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a).
See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a).
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552.
150 U.S. 653 (1893).
See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a).
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infringement and had a regular and established place of business.19
The Supreme Court in Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co.20
then found that this provision of the 1897 Act exclusively
controlled proper venue in suits for patent infringement,21 which is
a point particularly poignant to the recent TC Heartland decision.
With the passing of the Judiciary Act of 194822 came a
considerable overhaul regarding the federal statutory law on
general venue, providing that a defendant corporation “may be
sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed
to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall
be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue
purposes.”23 Although this change in the law did not alter the
federal patent venue statute, the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass
Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.24 reiterated the holding in
Stonite that the federal patent venue statute was the sole and
exclusive statutory provision governing venue in patent
infringement suits. In its 1957 opinion, in addition to the above
holding,25 the Supreme Court held that the residence prong is
synonymous with “domicile, and, in respect of corporations,
mean[s] the state of incorporation only.”26 Fourco also added that,
for venue to be proper, the defendant must either (1) reside in the
jurisdiction of its incorporation, meaning that it is incorporated in
the state, or (2) do business and commit an act of infringement in
the jurisdiction in which the suit is filed.27
In 1972, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of patent venue
in suits against non-resident alien defendants in Brunette Machine
Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.28 and held that such suits
may be filed in any district.29 Subsequently, a 1988 amendment to
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id.
315 U.S. 561 (1942).
See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012).
CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a).
353 U.S. 222 (1957).
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957).
Id. at 226.
See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a).
406 U.S. 706 (1972).
See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(a).
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the Judicial Code30 stated that, for the purposes of venue, a
defendant resides in any district in which it is subject to personal
jurisdiction.31 Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in its 1990 VE Holding
Corp. opinion held that, in light of these amendments to the
general venue statute, Fourco’s reading of the venue statute
governing patent infringement actions was an “anomaly,” and
“venue in a patent infringement case includes any district where
there would be personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant
at the time the action is commenced,” a broader conception of
venue than that of Fourco.32 The conflict between this broader
conception of patent venue on the basis of the general venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), and VE Holding Corp. and the
narrower view on patent venue premised on the specific patent
venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), and Fourco Glass Co. led to
the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods
Group Brands LLC.33
Leading into TC Heartland, both 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) were the relevant statutory provisions, in light of
the conflict as to whether the broader or narrower conception of
proper venue governed patent infringement actions.34 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c), the general venue provision, provides that defendant
entities reside in districts in which they are subject to personal
jurisdiction and that plaintiff entities reside in districts in which
they maintain their principal place of business.35 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b), the patent venue provision, provides that patent
infringement actions may be brought in districts in which the
defendant resides or in districts in which the defendant “has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
place of business.”36

30

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012).
See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2).
32
See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1582–83 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
33
See generally 137 S.Ct. 1514 (2017); CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2).
34
See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2).
35
Id.
36
Id.
31
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B. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC
TC Heartland is a landmark Supreme Court case addressing
the issue of “where proper venue lies for a patent infringement
lawsuit brought against a domestic corporation.”37 The petitioner,
TC Heartland, was an Indiana corporation headquartered in
Indiana that shipped allegedly infringing products into Delaware.38
The respondent, Kraft Foods, was a Delaware corporation
principally operating in Illinois.39 Kraft Foods initially filed suit for
patent infringement against TC Heartland in the District of
Delaware.40 TC Heartland subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
or transfer to the Southern District of Indiana on the basis of
improper venue in Delaware pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b),
claiming that it neither resided in the state of Delaware according
to the definition of residence in Fourco nor had a regular and
established place of business in Delaware.41 The District Court for
the District of Delaware found the arguments put forth by TC
Heartland unpersuasive, and the Federal Circuit also found the
same on the premise that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), as amended,
amended the definition of “resides” in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) to
permit suit to be filed against a defendant in any district in which
personal jurisdiction over that defendant exists.42 The Supreme
Court then granted certiorari on the issue.43
The Supreme Court noted that Fourco “definitively and
unambiguously held that the word ‘reside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) has a
particular meaning as applied to domestic corporations: [i]t refers
only to the [s]tate of incorporation.”44 Since the relevant statutory
provision was not amended between Fourco and the case at hand,
and neither party challenged the original Fourco holding, the
Supreme Court indicated that the only issue, a narrow subsection
of the broad patent venue issue, to be considered was whether

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1516.
Id. at 1517.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1517–18.
Id. at 1518.
Id. at 1520.
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amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) altered 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) as
well.45 In reversing the Federal Circuit and holding that the
residence of a corporation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is
solely its state of incorporation, the Court reasoned that (1)
Congress would have provided a clear indication of an interpretive
change to the patent venue provision contrary to Fourco if it
intended to make such change, (2) the saving clause in the general
venue provision renders the provision inapplicable when otherwise
provided by law, such as in the case of the patent venue provision,
and (3) Congress did not ratify the VE Holding Corp. decision in
its amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).46
II. POST-TC HEARTLAND: CONFLICTS WITHIN 28 U.S.C. § 1400(B)
Below is an aggregate of the decisions on motions to dismiss
and/or transfer that are relevant to patent venue analysis in a postTC Heartland era.47
A. Residence
The statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), outlines the two
prongs that independently satisfy the proper venue requirement in
patent infringement actions, one of which is the residence prong.48
The first prong provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent
45

Id.
See id. at 1520–21.
47
Note that the decisions on motions to dismiss and/or transfer are all relevant motions
to the current patent venue analysis, as of April 27, 2018, obtained through Westlaw and
the docketing system on Bloomberg Law. This material excludes decisions on motions
prior to the date of the TC Heartland decision, decisions on motions rendered moot based
on the now current state of the law (for example, pre-In re Micron decisions made on the
basis of waiver of the venue defense on the assumption that TC Heartland did not
constitute a change in the law), decisions on motions lacking an analysis of the merits of
the decision, decisions on motions that have been subsequently overruled, decisions on
motions and issues that are unopposed or joined by the opposing party, decisions on
motions in cases not pending at the time of decision, decisions on motions for discovery
related to venue, decisions on motions that address residence but principally address
other issues (not included in the residence section), decisions on motions in courts other
than district courts, and motions filed but not decided. This material includes some
motions not solely to transfer and/or dismiss but that are still relevant and pertinent to the
subject.
48
CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(c).
46
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infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the
defendant resides….”49 The Supreme Court addressed the issue
again most recently in 2017 in TC Heartland.50 In TC Heartland,
the Court explicitly reversed the Federal Circuit’s VE Holding
decision and held that the residence prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
refers solely to a defendant’s state of incorporation.51 In doing so,
the Court reasoned that (1) Fourco is the valid and controlling
precedent, (2) Congress did not intend to change the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) through its amendments to the general venue
statute, especially in light of the saving clause in the current
version of the general venue statute, and (3) Congress did not ratify
VE Holding.52
Courts have been forced to reevaluate and alter their former
analysis of patent venue, with respect to the residence prong,
following the decision in TC Heartland.
1. First Circuit
In Presby Patent Trust v. Infiltrator Water Technologies, LLC,
Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. of the United States District Court
for the District of Maine narrowly evaluated the residence prong of
the patent venue statute.53 Because the defendant was incorporated
in Delaware, the court found that it simply did not reside in Maine
and, therefore, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for
improper venue.54
2. Fifth Circuit
Although the defendant asserted improper venue based on its
lack of presence in the Eastern District of Texas in Diem LLC v.
BigCommerce, Inc., Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas found venue to be
proper in the district because the defendant was incorporated in the
49

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–21.
51
See id. at 1521.
52
See id. at 1520–21.
53
See Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Water Techs., LLC, No. 2:17-CV-00068-JAW,
2017 WL 5895127, at *5 (D. Me. Nov. 29, 2017).
54
See id. at *5–7.
50
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state of Texas and therefore resided in each district in the multidistrict state.55 Therefore, the court denied the defendant’s motion
to dismiss.56
3. Sixth Circuit
When faced with the issue of where an unincorporated
association resides for the purposes of the patent venue statute in
Maxchief Investments Ltd. v. Plastic Development Group, LLC,
Judge Thomas W. Phillips of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee held that an unincorporated
association’s residence is its principal place of business and
therefore found venue to be improper and transferred the case.57
Judge Timothy S. Black of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio also found venue to be improper in
the district in Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Ranir, LLC because the
defendant was not incorporated in the state.58
4. Ninth Circuit
In Jinni Tech Ltd. v. Red.com, Inc., Judge James L. Robart of
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington similarly found venue to be improper as to one
defendant because of its incorporation in another state and its lack
of consent to venue.59 In the same case, the court found venue to
be proper as to another defendant because of its incorporation in
the state.60
Judge S. James Otero of the United States District Court for the
Central District of California addressed whether a defendant
resided in the jurisdiction of the court in a multi-district state

55
See Diem LLC v. BigCommerce, Inc., No. 6:17-CV-00186, 2017 WL 3187473, at
*2–3 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2017).
56
See id. at *4.
57
See Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Plastic Dev. Grp., LLC, No. 3:16-CV-63, 2017 WL
3479504, at *2, *5 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2017).
58
See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Ranir, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-185, 2017 WL 3537197, at
*3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2017).
59
See Jinni Tech Ltd. v. Red.com, Inc., No. C17-0217JLR, 2017 WL 4758761, at *8
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2017).
60
Id.
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pursuant to the first prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) in Realtime Data
LLC v. Nexenta Systems, Inc.61 The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss or transfer venue to the Northern District of California
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).62 In
considering the motion, the court first reasoned that 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b) is the sole statute governing patent venue and includes
language “in the judicial district where the defendant resides.”63 It
then considered Stonite Prods., which held that the analogous
statutory language from the time of the decision, “in the district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant,” meant only the district in
which the defendant is an inhabitant or resident and not all districts
of the multi-district state.64 Filing in the defendant’s state of
incorporation was found to be necessary but not sufficient to
satisfy the first statutory prong; the filing also had to be done in the
proper district, which was the defendant’s principal place of
business.65 In this case, the defendant’s headquarters and principal
place of business were in the Northern District of California; the
majority of employees relevant to the patent infringement suit
worked in the Northern District of California; and the defendant
had no offices, places of business, property, or employees in the
Central District of California.66 The court ultimately found that, “in
the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), a corporate defendant ‘resides’
only in the state of its incorporation and, within that state, only in
the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of
business” and transferred the case to the Northern District of
California.67
The decisions on motions referenced above found proper
residence to be lacking in five cases and present in two cases.68
The larger proportion of findings of a lack of proper residence may
be attributable to filings prior to the TC Heartland decision in
61
See Realtime Data LLC v. Nexenta Sys., Inc., No. CV 2:17–07690 SJO (JCx), 2018
WL 2724776, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018).
62
See id. at *1.
63
Id. at *2, *3 (emphasis added).
64
See id. at *3.
65
See id. at *3.
66
See id. at *2.
67
See id. at *4.
68
See discussion supra notes 53–67.
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reliance on the former definition of “residence,” as opposed to the
changed definition of “residence” set forth in TC Heartland.
TABLE 1:
Proper Residence Absent

Proper Residence Present

5

2

B. Regular and Established Place of Business
The second prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) requires that a
defendant, to satisfy proper venue, have a regular and established
place of business and have committed acts of infringement in the
relevant district, providing that “[a]ny civil action for patent
infringement may be brought in the judicial district . . . where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular
and established place of business.”69 In declining to issue a writ of
mandamus ordering the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota to dismiss the instant action on the basis of improper
venue,70 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held the
proper inquiry regarding the regular and established place of
business component of the second prong to be not whether the
defendant has a fixed physical presence in the district but whether
the “defendant does its business in that district through a
permanent and continuous presence there.”71
Following TC Heartland’s revival of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) and
the uncertainty regarding the meaning of a regular and established
place of business,72 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
addressed the issue again and held that a defendant has a regular
and established place of business in the district if the place of
business is (1) a physical place in the district; (2) a regular and
established place of business; and (3) the place of the defendant.73
Extrapolating upon these requirements, the place must be a
physical location at which business is conducted but need not be a
69
70
71
72
73

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
See In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
See id. at 737.
See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1360.
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traditional store or office.74 The place must be regular, in that it is
steady and consistent, and established, meaning that it is
sufficiently permanent.75 Lastly, the place must be of the defendant
and ratified as such and not merely of the defendant’s employee or
employees.76 This is evidenced through the defendant’s exercise of
possession or control and is considered in light of property
ownership, employment conditioned upon employee residence in
the district, the storage of materials at such place, advertisements
and representations by the defendant holding the defendant out as
having a place of business in the district, and comparisons to
similar places of business in other venues.77
1. Second Circuit
After citing the three In re Cray elements in Peerless Network,
Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
noted that the sole physical presence of the defendant in the
jurisdiction was a shelf containing telecommunications equipment
at the place of the plaintiff.78 The court found that this shelf
satisfied the physical place requirement and the requirement that it
be of the defendant but that the shelf was not a regular and
established place of business because no agents of the defendant
engaged in business from the shelf.79 Therefore, the court found
the venue to be improper and transferred the case.80
2. Third Circuit
The court in Telebrands Corp. v. Illinois Industrial Tool, Inc.
held that, because the defendant’s primary offices and headquarters
were in Illinois, its chief financial officer worked from an office in
Illinois, the defendant was incorporated in Illinois, the majority of
the defendant’s employees worked in Illinois, and its related
74

Id. at 1362.
Id.
76
Id. at 1363.
77
See id.
78
See Peerless Network, Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, No. 17-CV-1725
(JPO), 2018 WL 1478047, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2018).
79
See id. at *3–5.
80
See id. at *5.
75
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individuals and facilities did not exist in New Jersey, the defendant
did not have a regular and established place of business in New
Jersey.81 Therefore, Chief Judge Jose L. Linares of the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey found venue to
be improper and transferred the case.82
3. Fourth Circuit
In Flexible Technologies, Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating LLC,
Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin of the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina reasoned that merely doing
business in a jurisdiction is insufficient to establish a regular and
established place of business in that jurisdiction.83
In Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Tietex International, Ltd.,
Judge Thomas D. Schroeder of the Middle District of North
Carolina applied the In re Cray elements but recognized the
guidance by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that
evaluating a regular and established place of business is a factspecific inquiry.84 After considering the factors of (1) ownership,
lease, or control over the premises, (2) employment conditioned on
residence in the jurisdiction, (3) storage of inventory at the place,
and (4) representations by the defendant of the place as its place of
business, the Court found the failure on the third In re Cray
element to be determinative because the employee’s presence and
actions in the jurisdiction did not satisfy such.85 Therefore, the
Court found venue to be improper.86
4. Fifth Circuit
Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas also applied the In re Cray elements
81
See Telebrands Corp. v. Ill. Indus. Tool, Inc., No. 17-3411 (JLL), 2017 WL
4157533, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2017).
82
See id. at *3.
83
See Flexible Techs., Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating LLC, No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC,
2018 WL 1175043, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2018) adopted by No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC,
2018 WL 1158425 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018).
84
See Precision Fabrics Grp., Inc. v. Tietex Int’l, Ltd., Nos. 1:13-CV-645, 1:14-CV650, 2017 WL 5176355, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2017).
85
See id. at *11–13.
86
See id. at *13.
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in Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc.87 With respect to the
first requirement for a physical place in the district, the defendant
had no physical presence or employees in the district, even though
the plaintiff alleged that it was interspersed with third-party
distributors in the district.88 The third factor was also unsatisfied
because of the lack of physical presence.89 The court found venue
to be improper and ultimately transferred the relevant claims to the
Central District of California.90
In Lites Out, LLC v. OutdoorLink, Inc., Judge Amos L.
Mazzant of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas found venue in the instant action to be improper and
transferred the case because the defendant lacked a physical
presence in the district, as required pursuant to the regular and
established place of business requirement of the second prong of
the patent venue statute.91
Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas considered a motion to dismiss for
improper venue in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc.92 In reasoning
as to whether the defendant had a regular and established place of
business in the district, the court found In re Cray to be
particularly relevant because of the factual similarities to the case
at hand.93 The defendant in that case was a seller of
supercomputers incorporated in Washington that did not possess
real estate in the district of suit but that did have a sales
representative who worked in the district from his private
residence.94 This representative managed many of the accounts of
the allegedly infringing products, communicated professionally
through a phone number from the district, received reimbursement
87

See Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc., No. H-17-3258, 2018 WL 1811354,
at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018).
88
Id. at *2.
89
See id.
90
See id. at *4.
91
See Lites Out, LLC v. OutdoorLink, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00192, 2017 WL 5068348,
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017).
92
See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00174-JRG, slip op. at 1 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 6, 2017).
93
See id. at 3.
94
See id. at 3–4.
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for various business activities, generated sales greater than $345
million, received support from the Minnesota office, could access
sales materials in his private residence, but did not and could not
store products in his private residence.95 Based largely upon the
failure to meet the requirements of a physical presence in the
district and that the regular and established place of business in the
district be of the defendant, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit found the facts of the case insufficient to find a regular and
established place of business in the district.96 In this case, Judge
Gilstrap emphasized that none of the private residences of the
defendant’s employees were the places of the defendant,97 the
responsibilities of the employees were not related to their residence
in the district,98 and the relatedness of the employees’ knowledge
to the alleged patent infringement did not substantiate a defendant
having a place in the district.99 Therefore, the court found that the
defendant did not have a regular and established place of business
in the Eastern District of Texas.100
Magistrate Judge Kimberly C. Priest Johnson of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas considered a
defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue in American
GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp.101 With respect to the motion regarding
defendant ZTE USA, which was not incorporated in the state of
Texas, the court had to consider whether it had a regular and
established place of business in the Eastern District of Texas.102
The presence of a call center with many of defendant’s
representatives, though a third-party call center, was found to
effectively rebut the defendant’s assertion that it did not have a
regular and established place of business in the district.103
95

See id. at 4.
See id. at 4–5.
97
See id. at 6.
98
See id. at 7.
99
See id. at 7–8.
100
See id. at 8.
101
See Am. GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17-CV-00620-ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL
5163605, at * 1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2017) adopted by No. 4:17-CV-00620-ALM-KPJ,
2017 WL 5157700 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017).
102
See id. at *3.
103
See id. at *3–4.
96
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Magistrate Judge Johnson, therefore, recommended denial of the
defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue,104 while Judge
Amos L. Mazzant overruled all relevant defense objections to the
recommendation, adopted Magistrate Judge Johnson’s report, and
denied the motion to dismiss for improper venue.105
In GEODynamics, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics US, Inc., Magistrate
Judge Roy S. Payne of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas held that the testimony of the CEO of the
defendant that the defendant was moving a distribution center to
the district was sufficient to find a regular and established place of
business in the district.106 Therefore, the court denied the defense
motion to dismiss or transfer the instant action.107
In Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., Judge Rodney
Gilstrap of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas noted the presence of defendants’ stores and facilities in
the district and ultimately found that the defendants did have a
regular and established place of business in the district.108
5. Sixth Circuit
In Automated Packaging Systems, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging
International, Inc., Judge Sara Lioi of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio analyzed and applied the
three In re Cray elements.109 The court first found that the
defendant neither had a physical place in the district nor had
employees who used their homes in the district in a way that would
constitute a physical place in the district.110 Second, the defendant
did not have a regular and established place of business in the
district because the employees living in the district were not
104

See id. at *7.
See Am. GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17-CV-00620-ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL
5157700, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. Nov 7, 2017).
106
See GEODynamics, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics US, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00371-RSP,
2017 WL 6452803, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017).
107
See id. at *2.
108
Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017 WL
5630023, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017).
109
See Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Int’l, Inc., No. 5:14CV-2022, 2018 WL 400326, at *7–10 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018).
110
See id. at *7.
105
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required to do so.111 Third, any place in the district was not of the
defendant because (1) it did not have property in the district, (2)
the employment of the two employees who resided in the district
was not conditioned on their residence in the district, (3) the homes
of such employees were not represented as places of business of
the defendant, (4) an employee’s servicing of customers in the
district was insufficient to establish it as the defendant’s place
without ratification by the defendant employer, (5) use of items in
the district provided by the defendant employer to employees was
not satisfactory to establish a place of the defendant, and (6)
equipment provided to customers in the district was not a place
over which the defendant could exercise authority.112
Consequently, the court found venue to be improper and
transferred the case.113
Because the defendant in JPW Industries, Inc. v. Olympia
Tools International, Inc. lacked a physical place in the jurisdiction,
Judge Jon P. McCalla of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee held that the defendant lacked a
regular and established place of business in the district and found
venue to be improper.114
6. Seventh Circuit
Judge Thomas M. Durkin of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois found that the defendant did not
have a regular and established place of business in the jurisdiction
in Talsk Research, Inc. v. Evernote Corp. because it lacked any
physical place in the district or full-time employees residing in the
district and merely maintained virtual stores there.115 In response to
the plaintiff’s assertion regarding the importance of the residents of
the district who served as community members of the virtual
stores, the court noted the lack of a fixed physical place in the
111

See id. at *8.
See id. at *8–9.
113
See id. at *10–11.
114
See JPW Indus., Inc., v. Olympia Tools Int’l, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-03153-JPM). 2017
WL 4512501, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2017).
115
See Talsk Research, Inc. v. Evernote Corp., No. 16-CV-2167, 2017 WL 4269004, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017).
112
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district, the lack of regularity and establishment of the community
members’ activities in the district, and the lack of the defendant’s
control over the community members sufficient to constitute any
of their places being of the defendant.116
In Niazi v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc., Judge James D. Peterson
of the Western District of Wisconsin held that the defendants did
not have a regular and established place of business in the district
because the allegations that the defendants employed sales
representatives in the jurisdiction and were registered with the state
merely evidenced that the defendants did business in the
jurisdiction and not that the defendants had a place of business in
the jurisdiction.117 Therefore, the court dismissed the case on the
basis of improper venue.118
The plaintiff in BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing
Medicine, Inc. asserted that the defendant had a regular and
established place of business in the jurisdiction on the basis of a
business registration and an agent for service of process in the state
in addition to a number of employees that worked from their
homes in the jurisdiction.119 Chief Judge Rubén Castillo of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
however, reasoned that (1) doing business in a jurisdiction does not
establish a physical place in such jurisdiction, and (2) employing
individuals who work from homes in the jurisdiction is also
insufficient because the homes are not of the defendant, regardless
of the listing of the home addresses for workers’ compensation
purposes.120 The court granted the defense motion to dismiss for
improper venue.121
In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of
improper venue in SportPet Designs Inc. v. Cat1st Corp., Judge
Lynn Adelman of the United States District Court for the Eastern
116

See id. at *3–5.
See Niazi v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., Nos. 17-CV-183-jdp, 17-CV-184-jdp, 17-CV185-jdp, 17-CV-283-jdp, 2017 WL 5159784, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2017).
118
See id. at *5.
119
See BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing Med., Inc., No. 17 C 5636, 2017
WL 5146008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017).
120
See id. at *2–3.
121
See id. at *4.
117
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District of Wisconsin focused on the three In re Cray elements.122
Because the regular and established physical place of business in
the district was of Amazon and not of the defendant, the court held
venue in the district to be improper, even though the defendant
shipped its goods through Amazon’s place of business.123
7. Eighth Circuit
Judge Susan Richard Nelson of the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota also addressed the statutory
requirement for a regular and established place of business in the
district in Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Gilead
Sciences, Inc.124 The court relied upon In re Cray to decide the
defendant’s motion to transfer venue.125 In noting that the first
requirement mandates a physical and geographical location in the
district that need not be fixed but cannot be virtual, Judge Nelson
found this requirement to be unsatisfied because the defendant’s
employees did not work in a standalone office in the district and
did not have homes that functioned as such, and the defendant had
no secretarial or administrative support in the area.126 With respect
to the second requirement for a regular and established place of
business, the court found that the defendant failed to meet this
requirement, as the relevant employees could move their homes of
their own volition, and the defendant’s service to customers and
significant sales figures in Minnesota were insufficient to establish
such.127 Finally, the court found the defendant’s evidence as to the
third requirement, that the place in the district be of the defendant,
insufficient.128 Judge Nelson ultimately granted the motion and
transferred the case to the Northern District of California.129

122

See SportPet Designs Inc. v. Cat1st Corp., No. 17-CV-0554, 2018 WL 1157925, at
*3–4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 2018).
123
See id.
124
Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-06056-JCS, slip
op. at 10–20 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2017).
125
See id.
126
See id. at 10–13.
127
See id. at 14–15.
128
See id. at 15–20.
129
See id. at 21.

2019]

THE AFTEREFFECTS OF TC HEARTLAND

1047

In Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. General Mills, Inc., Judge
Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri held that the defendants did not
have a regular and established place of business in the jurisdiction
because the defendants did not have a physical place of business in
the jurisdiction.130
8. Ninth Circuit
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California transferred Gillespie
v. Prestige Royal Liquors Corp. to the Southern District of New
York in response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer
for improper venue.131 The court found that the defendant did not
have a regular and established place of business in the district
because the plaintiff merely alleged acts of infringement in the
district and did not allege that the defendant had a regular and
established place of business in the district.132
Judge Richard A. Jones of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington found venue to be improper in
Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc. because the plaintiff failed to
allege that the defendant had a physical place that was a regular
and established place of business in the district.133 Therefore, the
Court transferred the case.134
After finding “no factual basis upon which the Court can
conclude that 3M has ‘a regular and established’ place of business
in this District, and certainly no basis for concluding that Northstar
does,” Judge Ronald B. Leighton of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the case in
Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co.135
130

See Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2471 SNLJ, 2017
WL 4865936, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2017).
131
Gillespie v. Prestige Royal Liquors Corp., No. 4:16-CV-02392-HSG., 2017 WL
3232462, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2017).
132
See id.
133
See Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc., No. C17-549 RAJ, 2018 WL 828225, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2018).
134
See id. at *3.
135
Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co., No. C17-5067RBL, 2017 WL 6034222, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 6, 2017).
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The issue of the regular and established place of business
requirement was addressed again by Judge William H. Orrick of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California in Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC.136 The court also
found that a defendant must have more contact with the district in
which suit is filed than only doing business or having sales
representatives or independent dealers present in the district and
consequently transferred the case to the District of Colorado in
response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer.137
In Reflection, LLC v. Spire Collective LLC, Judge Gonzalo P.
Curiel of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of California reasoned that (1) the storage and shipment of the
defendant’s goods through Amazon fulfillment centers in the
district did not satisfy the first In re Cray factor; (2) the shipment
of the defendant’s goods to and from Amazon fulfillment centers
in the district did not establish a regular and established place of
business; and (3) the Amazon fulfillment centers were not the
places of the defendant, even though the defendant paid a monthly
fee, because the defendant did not control where Amazon directed
its goods.138 Consequently, the court dismissed the case.139
Citing the In re Cray requirements in Nike, Inc. v. Skechers
U.S.A., Inc., Magistrate Judge Paul Papak of the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon concluded that the
defendant did not have a regular and established place of business
in the jurisdiction because it (1) did not have property in the
district, (2) did not have a license to do business in the district, (3)
did not have employees residing in the district, and (4) had
employees that intermittently traveled to the district but used

136

See Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-00506-WHO, 2018 WL
317839, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2018).
137
See id. at *3–4.
138
See Reflection, LLC v. Spire Collective LLC, No. 17CV1603-GPC(BGS), 2018 WL
310184, at *2–4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018).
139
See id. at *4–5.
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independent contractors within the district.140 Therefore, the court
found venue to be improper and transferred the case.141
After noting the three In re Cray elements, Judge David C. Nye
of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho
concluded in CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Light Efficient Design that the
defendant did not have a regular and established place of business
in the jurisdiction because (1) its sales representatives were not
based in Idaho and therefore did not have a physical presence
there, (2) its distributors’ locations in the district were not of the
defendant, and (3) neither the website of the defendant listing its
contacts in the district nor its sales revenue from the district were
sufficient to establish such.142
XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., decided by Judge
Richard Seeborg of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, raised the issue of whether the
regular and established place of business requirement was met in
the instant case.143 The court reiterated the In re Cray factors144
and, in deciding to deny the defendant’s motion to transfer the case
to Delaware, noted that the defendant did not regularly engage in a
substantial portion of its business on a permanent basis and at a
physical location over which the defendant exercises control in
Delaware.145
In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer the
case in Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., Judge
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California found the In re Cray requirements
to be satisfied because the defendant leased and operated
properties in the district and because there was no nexus
requirement between the regular and established place of business
140

See Nike, Inc. v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-007-PK, 2017 WL 7275389, at
*6–7 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2017).
141
See id. at *8.
142
See CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Light Efficient Design, No. 4:16-CV-00482-DCN, 2017
WL 4556717, at *3 (D. Idaho Oct. 11, 2017).
143
See XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-03848-RS, 2017 WL
4551519, at *2, *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017).
144
See id. at *2.
145
See id. at *4, *6.
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and the act of infringement requirements under the second prong of
the patent venue statute.146
9. Tenth Circuit
Considering the regular and established place of business
element of the second prong of the patent venue statute in RMH
Tech LLC v. PMC Industries, Inc., Judge Christine M. Arguello of
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado found
that the defendant lacked a physical place in the district, as it did
not have any physical or geographical business location in the
district, and concluded that the defendant did not have a regular
and established place of business in the district. Therefore, venue
was improper.147
Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty of the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, in Hildebrand v.
Wilmar Corp, found that the only possible physical locations in the
district would be the distributors’ locations, which are not “of the
defendant” and also may not be regular and established places of
business.148 Consequently, the court held that the defendant did not
have a regular and established place of business in the jurisdiction
and dismissed the case.149
10. Eleventh Circuit
In Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distributors, Inc., after
applying the In re Cray requirements and recognizing the intent of
Congress to limit the venues to which a defendant can be
subjected, Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida transferred the case
because he found the plaintiff’s assertions insufficient to sustain

146

See Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 17-CV-04405-HSG, 2017 WL
6389674, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017).
147
See RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Indus., Inc., No. 16-CV-01762-CMA-KMT, 2018 WL
1566839, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2018).
148
See Hildebrand v. Wilmar Corp., No. 17-CV-02821-PAB-MEH, 2018 WL 1535505,
at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2018)
149
See id. at *5.
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venue.150 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant derived revenue
from products sold in the jurisdiction and that the defendant’s
website permitted dealers to sell its products in the jurisdiction.151
The court rejected the claim because of the lack of a physical place
in the district.152
In Townsend v. Brooks Sports, Inc., Judge Sheri Polster
Chappell of the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida found it clear that the defendant lacked a regular and
established place of business in the district and noted that it only
had U.S. facilities in the state of Washington and engaged in all
activities related to the allegedly infringing product in
Washington.153
In ParkerVision, Inc. v. Apple Inc., Judge Brian J. Davis of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida also
applied the In re Cray factors in analyzing whether the defendant
had a regular and established place of business in the district.154
The court specifically focused on the requirement for a physical
place in the district, by noting that the defendant had a physical
and geographical location at which business was done, and the
requirement that the defendant have a regular and established place
of business in the district, a fact-specific inquiry.155 Therefore, the
court denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss and transfer
venue.156
The decisions on motions referenced above found a regular and
established place of business to be lacking in twenty-six cases and
present in six cases.157 The disparity, as with the disparity in
outcomes in the cases dealing with residence in a particular venue,
is likely due to filings in the proper venue pursuant to the pre-TC
150

See Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., No. 17-23060-Civ-Scola, 2017
WL 5032989, at *5–6, 8–9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017).
151
Id. at *6.
152
See Id.
153
See Townsend v. Brooks Sports, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-62-FtM-38MRM, 2017 WL
6417328, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2017).
154
ParkerVision, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01477-BJD-JRK, 2018 WL
5084662, at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2018).
155
See id. at *8–9.
156
See id. at *11.
157
See supra notes 78–154.
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Heartland definition of “residence” but in the improper venue
pursuant to the TC Heartland definition of “residence” and a
subsequent attempt to fit the requirements for having a regular and
established place of business in a particular venue instead.
Additionally, the decision of the Federal Circuit in In re Cray
prospectively clarified the requirements for having a regular and
established place of business in a judicial district and will likely
equalize the motion outcomes.
TABLE 2:
Regular and Established Place
of Business Absent
26

Regular and Established Place
of Business Present
6

C. Foreign Defendants
The Court in TC Heartland noted that its decision did not
address the ramifications of patent venue for foreign defendants158
and reiterated Fourco’s holding as applied to “domestic
corporations.”159 The following cases demonstrate the current
trends of district court venue requirements for foreign defendants.
1. Third Circuit
Judge Leonard P. Stark of the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware reasoned in 3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC
Corp. that the general venue statute, rather than the patent venue
statute, governs venue in patent infringement actions for foreign
defendants and therefore found that venue was proper in the
district.160
2. Fourth Circuit
In Mya Saray, LLC v. Dabes, Senior Judge Glen E. Corlrad of
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
158

See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 n.2
(2017).
159
See id. at 1520.
160
See 3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC Corp., No. 17-83-LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 6442101, at
*2 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2017).
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reiterated that the patent venue statute applies exclusively to
domestic corporations and therefore held that the foreign defendant
in the instant case could be sued in any judicial district, pursuant to
the general venue provision.161
3. Ninth Circuit
As the defendants were foreign defendants in Red.com, Inc. v.
Jinni Tech Ltd., Judge Cormac J. Carney of the United States
District Court for the Central District of California found that the
patent venue statute did not apply and found venue to be proper.162
The decisions on the three motions referenced above all found
venue to be proper as to the foreign defendant(s).163 Although the
motion outcomes with respect to foreign defendants were the same,
the sample size is small, and TC Heartland did not affect the venue
analysis with respect to foreign defendants.
TABLE 3:
Patent Venue Statute Applicable
to Foreign Defendants
0

General Venue Statute
Applicable to Foreign
Defendants
3

D. Acts of Infringement
The second component of the second prong of 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b), which provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent
infringement may be brought in the judicial district . . . where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular
and established place of business,”164 requires that a defendant
have committed acts of infringement in the relevant district.165
Sufficient acts of infringement are making, using, offering to sell,
161

See Mya Saray, LLC v. Dabes, No. 3:17CV00016, 2018 WL 1161145, at *5–6
(W.D. Va. Mar. 5, 2018).
162
See Red.com, Inc. v. Jinni Tech Ltd., No. SACV 17-00382-CJC(KESx), 2017 WL
4877414, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017).
163
See supra notes 158–60.
164
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
165
CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(e).
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selling, or importing any patented invention into the United
States;166 inducement of patent infringement;167 and contributory
patent infringement.168 However, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) does provide
that making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing a patented
invention into the United States, which would otherwise constitute
an act of infringement, is not an act of infringement if such act is
done “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a [f]ederal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products.”169 This carve-out provision does have exclusions,
including Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDAs”) made
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act that have the purpose of obtaining “approval under
such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of
a drug, veterinary biological product, or biological product claimed
in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the
expiration of such patent.”170
1. Third Circuit
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
Judge Leonard P. Stark of the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware was presented with the issue of how the
Hatch-Waxman Act171 interacts with the acts of infringement
requirement pursuant to the second prong of the patent venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).172 In considering this issue, the court
first addressed the “has committed” language in the patent venue
statute and recognized an inherent temporal discord between the
patent venue statute, which concerns the past or present, and the
166

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
See id. § 271(b).
168
See id. § 271(c); CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(e).
169
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Note that this excludes animal drugs and veterinary
biological products “primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant
RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic
manipulation techniques.” Id.
170
Id. § 271(e)(2).
171
The Hatch-Waxman Act is a variety of amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, which is chapter 9 of title 21 of the United States Code.
172
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL
3980155, at *6 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017).
167
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Hatch-Waxman Act, which concerns future acts.173 While noting
that an ANDA submission constitutes an artificial act of
infringement that triggers the ability to file suit for patent
infringement prior to the introduction of a generic pharmaceutical
into the market, the court reasoned that, “in a Hatch-Waxman
lawsuit, the patent infringement inquiry is necessarily based on
future events that will occur following FDA approval, events that
have not yet actually occurred” and requires “the same type of
analysis involved in a typical patent infringement inquiry.”174
Consequently, the court found that it necessarily follows that the
ANDA submission is the triggering act for the availability of a
patent infringement suit but that considerations of the intent to
market the allegedly infringing product are also relevant to the
venue analysis.175 In reaching his conclusion with respect to this
issue, Judge Stark considered the above reasoning in conjunction
with a number of other factors.176 He additionally considered
future intended acts by an ANDA filer in the personal jurisdiction
analysis by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Acorda.177 The third consideration was the finding that the acts of
infringement requirement pursuant to the second prong of the
patent venue statute is applicable to Hatch-Waxman cases, even
though there will never be an actual act of infringement in such a
case.178 Finally, Judge Stark considered the lack of compelling
alternative conclusions and interpretations, including the assertion
that the proper venue for a case such as this is the jurisdiction from
which an ANDA submission is made, made from, or prepared.179
In concluding that the defendant did not sufficiently demonstrate
that it had not committed acts of infringement in the jurisdiction,
the court held that the above considerations could be sufficient to
evidence the commission of acts of infringement in the district.180

173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

See id.
See id. at *8.
See id.
See id. at *8–12.
See id. at *8–9.
See id. at *10.
See id. at *11.
See id. at *13.
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Judge Esther Salas of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey was faced with the same issue of what acts
by ANDA filers constitute acts of infringement sufficient to sustain
proper venue in a patent infringement suit in Celgene Corp. v.
Hetero Labs Ltd.181 While the defendant argued that the “has
committed” language in the patent venue statute expressly refers
only to past acts, the plaintiff argued that the factual circumstances
common to Hatch-Waxman cases necessarily require consideration
of intended future acts following prospective ANDA approval.182
The court found the plaintiff’s argument to align with BMS, but the
defendant argued that the BMS decision preceded the decision by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Cray, which
concluded that courts must not conflate the standards for proper
venue and for personal jurisdiction, and, therefore, should not be
followed.183 However, the court did not find the defendant’s
argument convincing because other district courts in the circuit
continued to follow BMS after In re Cray.184 Therefore, the court
found that the defendant did not show that it had not committed
acts of infringement in New Jersey and also denied the motion to
dismiss for improper venue.185
2. Fourth Circuit
In Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Systems, Inc., Judge
Arenda L. Wright Allen of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia found allegations of infringement to be
sufficient to sustain venue pursuant to the second prong of the
patent venue statute.186
3. Fifth Circuit
Chief Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas considered and decided a
181

See Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd., No. 17-3387 (ES) (MAH), 2018 WL
1135334, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018).
182
See id.
183
See id.
184
See id.
185
See id. at *3, *5.
186
See Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 928 (E.D.
Va. 2017).
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motion to dismiss for improper venue in a Memorandum Opinion
and Order in Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.187 Considering Teva’s motion to
dismiss for improper venue,188 the court was faced with the issue
of what acts by an ANDA filer, whose application contains a
Paragraph IV certification (certification “that a patent is invalid,
unenforceable, or will not be infringed”),189 sufficiently constitute
acts of infringement in a particular jurisdiction.190 The court
recognized that the filing of an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV
certification, a certification by an ANDA filer as to patent
invalidity, unenforceability, or non-infringement, is an act of
infringement, but it then noted that whether the mere intent to
market the allegedly infringing product in a particular jurisdiction
in itself constitutes an act of infringement was still an unanswered
inquiry.191 In addressing this issue, the court noted problems with a
decision by the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., which held that steps indicating the future intent of the
ANDA filer to market the allegedly infringing product in a
particular jurisdiction are sufficient to sustain proper venue with
respect to the requirement for acts of infringement.192 First, the
court reasoned that such a reading of the patent venue statute is
plainly contradictory to the statute’s plain language when it uses
the phrase “has committed.”193 Chief Judge Lynn noted that this
reading is supported by the guidance from the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid a liberal
interpretation of the patent venue statute.194 Second, the court
rejected the assertion that reading additional and future-oriented
acts of infringement into the statute is required to effectuate all of
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), as “[t]he statute itself recognizes the
187

See Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-01076-M, 2017
WL 6505793, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2017).
188
See id.
189
See id. at *2.
190
See id. at *2, *4.
191
See id. at *4.
192
See id. at *4–5.
193
See id. at *5.
194
See id.
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forward-looking nature of the litigation and identifies the ANDA
submission as an artificial act of infringement on which a lawsuit
can be based.”195 Finally, the court criticized the Delaware Court’s
conflation of standards for personal jurisdiction with standards for
proper venue.196 The court then affirmatively provided that, “[i]n
determining proper venue in a Hatch-Waxman Act case, it is
appropriate to look to the forum where the ANDA submission
itself was prepared and submitted.”197 Because of the failure to
establish the occurrence of an act of infringement in the
jurisdiction, the court granted the motion to dismiss on the basis of
improper venue.198
Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas in Intellectual Ventures II LLC v.
FedEx Corp. outlined the requirement for acts of infringement
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271.199 The defendants argued that the
plaintiff failed to make a plausible allegation of infringement and
impermissibly grouped all defendants into a single entity for the
purposes of the alleged infringement.200 However, the court found
the arguments unpersuasive because the plaintiff identified specific
entities and paired them with specific acts of infringement in some
circumstances, and the defendants acknowledged the existence of
the alleged conduct in the district.201 On the basis of this analysis,
the court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of
improper venue.202
Magistrate Judge Kimberly C. Priest Johnson of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas addressed the
issue of the requirement for acts of infringement pursuant to the
second prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) in her Order and Report and
Recommendation on the motion to dismiss for improper venue in

195

See id. at *6.
See id.
197
See id..
198
See id. at *7.
199
See Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017
WL 5630023, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017).
200
See id.
201
See id. at *8–9.
202
See id. at *1, *9.
196
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Snyders Heart Valve LLC v. St Jude Medical S.C., Inc.203 Though
the defendants admitted to activity in the district solely in the form
of clinical trials, they contended that this action was insufficient to
establish acts of infringement in the district because the acts were
not infringing pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).204 The plaintiff,
by contrast, asserted that the defendants’ affirmative defense was
irrelevant to the venue determination, relying principally upon
Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 565 F.3d 846
(Fed. Cir. 2009), and Ventrassist Pty Ltd. v. Heartware, Inc., 377
F. Supp. 2d 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2005); the courts in these cases held,
respectively, that a dispute as to the application of a safe harbor
exemption concerns the merits of the claims and that a plaintiff
need not negate an affirmative defense to prevail on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.205 The court found these cases
raised by the plaintiff to be persuasive, and it recommended that
the defendants’ motions to reconsider their previous motion to
dismiss on the basis of improper venue be denied.206 Judge Amos
L. Mazzant overruled all defense objections to the Order and
Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Johnson and
denied the defendants’ motions.207
4. Sixth Circuit
Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that
unsupported allegations of infringement by the plaintiff in Stuebing
Automatic Machine Co. v. Gavronsky did not sufficiently satisfy
the acts of infringement requirement pursuant to the second prong
of the patent venue statute.208

203

See Snyders Heart Valve LLC v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00812ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL 4563076, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2017), adopted by No.
4:16CV812, 2017 WL 4552517 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2017).
204
See id. at *3–4.
205
See id. at *5.
206
See id. at *5–6.
207
See Snyders Heart Valve LLC v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No. 4:16CV812, 2017
WL 4552517, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2017).
208
See Stuebing Automatic Mach. Co. v. Gavronsky, No. 1:16-CV-576, 2017 WL
3187049, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2017).
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5. Seventh Circuit
In deciding whether the defendant had committed sufficient
acts of infringement to sustain a patent infringement action in the
district pursuant to the second prong of the patent venue statute in
RAH Color Technologies, LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., Judge Amy
J. St. Eve of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois reasoned that the plaintiff’s allegations of
infringement through the use of the allegedly infringing software
in the district was sufficient to sustain the suit.209 The court
therefore denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of
improper venue.210
6. Ninth Circuit
In Prolacta Bioscience, Inc. v. Ni-Q, LLC, Judge S. James
Otero of the United States District Court for the Central District of
California considered the standard for the requirement of acts of
infringement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).211 Considering the
requirement for acts of infringement in the district for proper
venue, the court noted that the complaint had no allegations of
substantive acts of infringement in the district, customers in the
district, offers for sale in the district, or hospital or clinic
distributors in the district.212 In addition, the defendant could not
legally sell or offer for sale the allegedly infringing product in the
district or state because it required licensed sale at tissue banks, not
had or done by the defendant.213 Judge Otero also particularly
noted that distribution of promotional materials in the district did
not qualify as an offer for sale.214 The court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(3).215

209

See RAH Color Techs., LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., No. 17 C 4931, 2018 WL
439210, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2018).
210
See id. at *3.
211
See Prolacta Bioscience, Inc. v. Ni-Q, LLC, No. CV 17-04071 SJO (Ex), 2017 WL
5664985, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017).
212
See id.
213
See id. at *5.
214
See id.
215
See id. at *1, *7–8.
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In denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of
improper venue in IPS Group, Inc. v. CivicSmart, Inc., Judge
Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California concluded that allegations of
infringement in the district, bolstered by factual support on the
basis of information and belief of the plaintiff, were sufficient to
sustain venue.216
In Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., Judge
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California reasoned that allegations of
infringement in the district, through sales and offers for sale of the
allegedly infringing product, were sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of an act of infringement pursuant to the second prong
of the patent venue statute.217
7. Eleventh Circuit
In Townsend v. Brook Sports, Inc., Judge Sheri Polster
Chappell of the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida found venue to be improper on the basis that the alleged
acts of infringement that occurred were in Washington or in
foreign countries.218
In Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distributors, Inc., because
the plaintiff alleged infringing offers for sale and sales in its
complaint, Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida found that it satisfied the
acts of infringement requirement of the second prong of the patent
venue statute.219
The decisions on motions referenced above found acts of
infringement to be lacking in four cases and present in nine

216

See IPS Grp., Inc. v. CivicSmart, Inc., No. 17-CV-0632-CAB (MDD), 2017 WL
4810099, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017).
217
See Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 17-CV-04405-HSG, 2017 WL
6389674, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017).
218
See Townsend v. Brooks Sports, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-62-FtM-38MRM, 2017 WL
6417328, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2017).
219
See Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., No. 17-23060-Civ-Scola, 2017
WL 5032989, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017).
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cases.220 The standard for determining the existence of acts of
infringement also remained unaffected by the TC Heartland
decision, and the distinctions in motion outcomes must therefore
be attributable to other forces.
TABLE 4:
Acts of Infringement Absent
4

Acts of Infringement Present
9

III. POST-TC HEARTLAND: CONFLICTS IN ASSERTING AND
DEFENDING AGAINST IMPROPER VENUE CLAIMS
A. Waiver or Forfeiture of Venue
“Improper venue is a defense and will be deemed waived by
the defendant if not raised in a timely fashion.”221 Such waiver can
come in the form of either failure to comply with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12 or by litigation conduct prior to making an
objection on the basis of improper venue.222 With respect to a
procedural waiver, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides
in pertinent part:
A motion asserting any of these defenses [including
improper venue] must be made before pleading if a
responsive pleading is allowed. If a pleading sets
out a claim for relief that does not require a
responsive pleading, an opposing party may assert
at trial any defense to that claim. No defense or
objection is waived by joining it with one or more
other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or in a motion.223
With respect to the possibility of waiver by litigation conduct,
steps found to be sufficient include a motion for summary
220

See supra text accompanying notes 170–217.
CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(g).
222
See Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017
WL 5630023, at *2–4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017).
223
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
221
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judgment, participation in another party’s motion to change venue
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and a motion to set aside a
decree.224
In the instance of waiver as related to TC Heartland, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded in In re Micron that
the TC Heartland decision represented a change in the law and
made available an objection on the basis of improper venue that
was not available prior to TC Heartland, rendering waiver pursuant
to Rule 12 inapplicable under the circumstances.225 However, the
court found that “district courts have authority to find forfeiture of
a venue objection” and, after noting the considerations of
timeliness, consent, and “wait-and-see” tactical strategies, declined
to identify “what if any other considerations could justify a finding
of forfeiture even when the defendant has not waived its objection
under Rule 12(g)(2) and (h)(1)(A).”226
1. Third Circuit
Judge Richard G. Andrews of the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware noted in T-Jat Systems 2006 Ltd. v.
Expedia, Inc. (DE) that, while “a party may not bring a venue
defense it could have raised in its first responsive pleading” under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, this Rule is excepted if the
venue defense was unavailable when the first responsive pleading
was filed.227 Since the venue defense here was unavailable when
the defendant filed its answer and pre-answer motion, the venue
defense was not waived.228
Judge Leonard P. Stark of the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware found the objection to venue to be timely
in 3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC Corp.229 Judge Stark similarly

224

See CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(g) n.123 (quoting Marquest Med. Prod., Inc.
v. EMDE Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (D. Colo. 1980)).
225
See In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091, 1095–1101 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
226
See id. at 1101–02.
227
See T-Jat Sys. 2006, Ltd. v. Expedia, Inc. (DE), No. 16-581-RGA, 2018 WL
1525496, at *7 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2018).
228
See id.
229
See 3G Licensing, S.A., v. HTC Corp., No. 17-83-LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 6442101, at
*1 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2017).
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reasoned that the venue objection was unavailable prior to the TC
Heartland decision.230
Judge Sherry R. Fallon of the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware found no waiver or forfeiture of venue in
Treehouse Avatar LLC v. Valve Corporation.231 Because In re
Micron held TC Heartland to be an intervening change in the law,
the court concluded that there had been no waiver of the venue
objection.232 Additionally, the venue defense had not been
forfeited, given the narrow ability to find forfeiture, because trial
was not immediately impending, the defendant previously
contested venue, and the defendant timely asserted its venue
defense following TC Heartland and otherwise.233
In Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. OKI Data Americas,
Inc., the plaintiff asserted that the defendants waived the improper
venue defense because of (1) the six-month period between the TC
Heartland decision and the filing of the motions on the basis of
improper venue and (2) the other motions that did not include the
improper venue objections.234 Judge Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania recognized that waiver is possible regardless of the
In re Micron decision.235 However, with respect to the first
assertion, given that the delays in the filing of motions following
the lifting of the stays in the cases were only in the range of three
to five months and that the cases were relatively inactive during
the delay periods, the venue objection was not waived.236 The
second alleged basis for waiver, the lack of inclusion of objections
to improper venue in the prior motions filed for failure to
prosecute, was not a sufficient basis for establishing the waiver of
the improper venue objection because the motions were not
230

See id.
See Treehouse Avatar LLC v. Valve Corp., No. 15-427-JFB-SRF, 2017 WL
5564153, at *3 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 2017) adopted by No. 1:15CV427, 2017 WL 6210506
(D. Del. Dec. 8, 2017).
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
See Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v. OKI Data Ams., Inc., Nos. 12-6797, 12-6799,
12-6800, 12-6806, 2018 WL 1035793, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018)
235
See id.
236
See id.
231
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substantive and were merely filed in response to a perceived
abandonment of the cases by the plaintiff.237 The court rejected the
plaintiff’s assertion that the defendants forfeited the venue
objection based on their active litigation participation, reasoning
that the conduct of the defendants after and not before the TC
Heartland decision was pertinent to the inquiry and that such
conduct was only the motions for failure to prosecute and
compliance with a court order.238
In Boston Scientific Corp. v. Cook Group Inc., Judge Leonard
P. Stark of the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware held that the defendants had not waived their venue
challenge.239 In making such decision, the court reasoned that the
trial in the instant case was more than six months away and would
likely be delayed because of a stay, the defendants filed the instant
motion only one month after the TC Heartland decision, the
plaintiffs would not suffer undue prejudice on the basis of transfer
of venue, and the defense participation in the litigation should not
be held against it as it was court-ordered.240 Therefore, Judge Stark
transferred the case.241
2. Fourth Circuit
Judge Richard L. Voorhees of the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina held that the defendant
had not waived its venue objection.242 The basis for this conclusion
was that the defendant in Simpson Performance Products, Inc. v.
NecksGen, Inc. filed its motion to dismiss on the basis of improper
venue only two weeks after the TC Heartland decision, the instant
case was in an early procedural posture, the plaintiff did not assert
prejudice by the raising of the motion at this stage, and transfer

237

See id. at *6.
See id. at *6–7.
239
See Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 229, 243 (D. Del. 2017).
240
See id.
241
See id. at 251.
242
See Simpson Performance Prods., Inc. v. NecksGen, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-00153-RLVDCK, 2017 WL 3616764, at *7–8 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2017).
238
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would not pose a risk to the plaintiff of a statute of limitations
bar.243 Therefore, the court transferred the case.244
Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney of the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina concluded that the
defendant in Eyetalk365, LLC v. Skybell Technologies, Inc. waived
its venue challenge because it proceeded with the litigation for
over two months following the TC Heartland decision and prior to
filing its motion on the basis of improper venue.245
In Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., Senior Judge Henry
Coke Morgan, Jr. of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia found that the defendant forfeited its
venue defense because the instant motion was untimely, as the
defendant did not “adequately contest venue” prior to the case
reaching “the point of no reasonable return,” and was one of a
series of delay tactics in the case.246
3. Fifth Circuit
Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas found in BASF Corp. v. SNF
Holding Co. that the defendants did not waive their venue defense
by failing to raise such pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).247
Therefore, the court granted the defense motion for reconsideration
and transferred the case.248
In Nichia Corp. v. Vizio, Inc., Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
addressed motions to dismiss or transfer for improper venue made
by the defendants.249 The plaintiff argued for a narrow reading of

243

See id. at *7.
See id. at *8.
245
See Eyetalk365, LLC v. Skybell Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00702-FDW-DCK, 2017
WL 3669548, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2017).
246
See Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., No. 2:15CV21, 2017 WL 6034504, at
*12–13 (E.D. Va. Dec. 4, 2017).
247
See BASF Corp. v. SNF Holding Co., No. 4:14-CV-2733, 2017 WL 7790618, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2017).
248
See id.
249
See Nichia Corp. v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-01453-JRG, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 2, 2018).
244
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In re Micron on the basis that the objection to venue became
available upon TC Heartland’s filing of a petition for certiorari at
the U.S. Supreme Court on September 12, 2016.250 The plaintiff
also asserted that failure to assert such an objection to venue in a
responsive pleading when there is a good-faith argument for
making a change in the law constitutes a waiver.251 However, the
court rejected these arguments, noting that the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has found waiver arguments to be excepted
in light of the intervening change of law in TC Heartland.252 In
observing that the defendants also had not committed non-Rule 12
waivers, Judge Gilstrap found venue to be improper and granted
the defendants Feit, Vizio, and LG Sourcing’s motions to
dismiss.253
In Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Digital, LLC, Magistrate Judge
John D. Love of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas found that the defendant did not waive its venue
objection, as there had not been extensive litigation in the case, and
the plaintiff’s allegation that the timing of the defendant’s instant
motion was made in bad faith was unsubstantiated.254
In Kaist IP US LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Magistrate
Judge Roy S. Payne of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas issued a Report and Recommendation
with respect to the two defendants’ motions to dismiss or transfer

250

See id. at 7.
See id. at 7–8.
252
See id. at 9. The court noted that this rejection is consistent with Federal Circuit
precedents in In re Cutsforth, Inc., 2017 WL 5907556 (Fed. Cir. 2017), which held that
failure to assert an improper venue defense at the initial stages of litigation prior to TC
Heartland did not constitute a waiver, and in In re Fluidmaster, Inc., No. 18-109 (Fed.
Cir. Jan. 17, 2018), which similarly held that failure to assert an improper venue defense
in a responsive pleading or amendment permitted as a matter of course did not constitute
a waiver because such a defense was barred at the time the objection would have been
proper. See id. at 8–9.
253
See id. at 10–11.
254
See Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Dig., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS-JDL, 2017 WL
3263871, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 28, 2017), adopted by sub nom. Blue Spike, LLC v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS, 2017 WL 4129321 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017).
251
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on the basis of improper venue.255 In addressing when a defendant
waives the defense of improper venue in a patent infringement suit,
the court noted four circumstances under which a defendant may
waive such a defense: (1) failure to move the court pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1)(B)(i); (2) failure to object
to venue in a responsive pleading or amendment permitted under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) as a matter of course; (3)
failure to object to venue when moving the court pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 for reasons other than venue;
and (4) litigating a case, even after an initial objection to venue.256
The court found the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
suggestion that courts consider waiver of the venue defense in the
time frame from when the defense became available to when the
defense is asserted instructive.257 Because of the defendants’
respective delays of approximately four and five months following
the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland and the litigation
schedule, regardless of the discussions with plaintiff Kaist
concerning venue alternatives, Judge Payne recommended the
denial of the motions.258
Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas addressed the defendants’ motions to
dismiss on the basis of improper venue in Intellectual Ventures II
LLC v. FedEx Corp.259 While recognizing the recent decision by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Micron, the
court noted that the power to find a waiver of the venue defense on
the basis of conduct or circumstances outside the purview of the In
re Micron decision remained within the province of district
courts.260 Noting the instructions by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit to consider the possibility of such a waiver from
the time the defense becomes available, the court in the instant
255
See KAIST IP US LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:16-CV-01314-JRG-RSP, 2017
WL 7058227, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017) adopted by No. 2:16-CV-01314-JRG-RSP,
2018 WL 2731932 (E.D. Tex. June 6, 2018).
256
See id.
257
See id. at *1–2.
258
See id. at *2.
259
See Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017
WL 5630023, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017).
260
See id. at *3.
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case looked to the defendant’s conduct after the date of the TC
Heartland decision.261 The defendants actively continued with the
litigation for months by, for example, serving subpoenas, filing
responsive briefings, and engaging in claim constructions.262
Additionally, the defendants filed a motion to transfer the case to
another jurisdiction on a basis other than improper venue, 28
U.S.C. § 1404, prior to the TC Heartland decision but did not raise
the issue of improper venue, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406, which
led to the appearance that the defendants intended to defend the
case on the merits.263 In light of this analysis, the court concluded
that the defendants had waived their objection to venue based upon
their conduct, judicial economy interests, and potential prejudice to
the plaintiff.264
4. Sixth Circuit
In considering the waiver issue in Automated Packaging
Systems, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging International, Inc., Judge
Sara Lioi of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio found that (1) concessions made by the defendant
that venue was proper prior to TC Heartland were of no effect
because they were made when the defense was unavailable; (2) the
defendant did not unreasonably delay its objection to venue, as it
filed its motion to dismiss for improper venue within one month of
the TC Heartland decision; (3) transfer would not be prejudicial as
the case was in an early procedural stature; and (4) trial was not
immediately impending.265 Therefore, the court found that the
defendant had not waived its venue defense.266
In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer in
Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Hantover, Inc., Judge Jeffrey J.
Helmick of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio found waiver of the objection to venue on the
261

See id.
See id.
263
See id.
264
See id. at *4.
265
See Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Int’l, Inc., No. 5:14CV-2022, 2018 WL 400326, at *4–5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018).
266
See id. at *5.
262

1070

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:1025

basis of the defendant’s assent to a settlement agreement providing
for jurisdiction over the case in the district.267
5. Seventh Circuit
Considering a supply agreement between the defendant and a
third party under which allegedly infringed products were sold in
Cellular Dynamics International, Inc. v. Lonza Walkersville, Inc.,
Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that the forum
selection clause in the agreement did not provide for proper venue
in the instant patent infringement action because the supply
agreement did not govern the patent infringement action.268
Therefore, the court transferred the case.269
Chief Judge Theresa L. Springmann of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana found in AgriLabs Holding LLC v. Taplogic, LLC that, even though the
defendant objected to venue one month after TC Heartland, the
defendant waived its venue defense because of the late procedural
stature of the case.270 Consequently, the court declined to dismiss
the case on the basis of improper venue.271
6. Eighth Circuit
Judge Susan Richard Nelson of the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota in Cutsforth, Inc. v. LEMM
Liquidating Co., LLC noted (1) the mere sixteen days between the
TC Heartland decision and the defense seeking of leave to file a
motion to transfer and the lack of underlying strategic tact in doing
so, (2) the greater prejudice to the defendants in subjecting them to
improper venue than prejudice to the plaintiffs in transferring the

267

See Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Hantover, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-406, 2018 WL 1942179, at
*3–4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2018).
268
See Cellular Dynamics Int’l, Inc. v. Lonza Walkersville, Inc., No. 17-CV-0027-slc,
2017 WL 4046348, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 12, 2017).
269
See id. at *8.
270
See Agri-Labs Holding LLC v. Taplogic, LLC, No. 1:15-CV-26-TLS, 2018 WL
437560, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2018).
271
See id.
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case, and (3) the lack of readiness of the case for trial.272 The court
therefore transferred the case.273
7. Ninth Circuit
In Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc., Judge Richard A.
Jones of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington found no waiver of the venue defense on the basis of
prompt filing of the relevant motion to dismiss and the early
procedural stature of the case.274
In response to the plaintiff’s assertion that the defendants
waived their objections to venue in National Products Inc. v.
Bracketron, Inc., Judge James L. Robart of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington reasoned that
the relevant date from which to consider possible waiver was the
date of the TC Heartland decision and that the defendants did not
waive the venue defense, as trial was not imminent; though the sixmonth delay between the decision of TC Heartland and the filing
of the instant motions was on the high end of a reasonable amount
of time, the delay would not prejudice the plaintiff or cause judicial
inefficiencies.275 Therefore, the court granted the defense’s motion
to transfer the case to a proper venue.276
Judge Ronald B. Leighton of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington in Nautilus, Inc. v. Icon
Health & Fitness, Inc. held that any prejudice to the plaintiff due to
the passage of time in the litigation or the litigation conduct by the
defendant was not due to the actions of the defendant but due to
the TC Heartland decision and the court docket and calendar in
Utah.277 The court therefore transferred the case.278
272

See Cutsforth, Inc. v. LEMM Liquidating Co., LLC, No. 12-1200 (SRN/LIB), 2018
WL 847763, at *3–5 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2018).
273
See id. at *5–6.
274
See Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc., No. C17-549 RAJ, 2018 WL 828225, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2018).
275
See Nat’l Prods. Inc. v. Arkon Res. Inc., Nos. C15-1984JLR, C15-1985JLR, C152024JLR, C16-0109JLR, 2018 WL 1457254, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2018).
276
See id. at *8.
277
See Nautilus, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. C16-5393-RBL, 2017 WL
5952375, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2017).
278
Id.
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8. Tenth Circuit
Judge Christine M. Arguello of the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado found no waiver of the defense
objection to venue in RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Industries, Inc.279
Additionally, the defendant did not forfeit its ability to make a
venue challenge by filing the instant motion to challenge venue on
the same day that the court denied reconsideration of claim
construction.280
Judge Dale A. Kimball of the United States District Court for
the District of Utah found waiver in InsideSales.com, Inc. v.
SalesLoft, Inc. when the defendant waited multiple weeks to
supplement its motions to dismiss on the basis of unpatentability
with objections on the basis of venue.281
The decisions on motions referenced above found no waiver or
forfeiture in seventeen cases and waiver or forfeiture in seven
cases.282 As In re Micron deemed TC Heartland to be an
intervening change in the law of patent venue, the remaining bases
for asserting waiver or forfeiture of an objection on the basis of
improper venue were unchanged by TC Heartland.

TABLE 5:
Waiver or Forfeiture Absent
16

Waiver or Forfeiture Present
7

279
See RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Indus., Inc., No. 16-CV-01762-CMA-KMT, 2018 WL
1566839, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2018).
280
See id.
281
See InsideSales.com, Inc. v. SalesLoft, Inc., No. 2:16CV859DAK, 2017 WL
4280386, at *3 (D. Utah Sept. 26, 2017).
282
See discussion supra notes 225–79.
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B. Relevant Date of Venue Analysis in Motions to Dismiss or
Transfer on the Basis of Improper Venue
With respect to the relevant date of analysis for venue, the case
law is unclear as to whether the appropriate date from which to
determine proper venue is the date of the filing of the complaint,
the date of service of the complaint upon the defendant, or the time
at which the cause of action accrued.283
1. First Circuit
Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. of the United States District
Court for the District of Maine concluded in Presby Patent Trust v.
Infiltrator Water Technologies, LLC that the proper date of
analysis as to whether the defendant has a regular and established
place of business in the jurisdiction is the accrual of the claim,
provided that the suit is filed within a reasonable time following
claim accrual.284
2. Third Circuit
In Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. OKI Data Americas,
Inc., Judge Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected a
rule of law that would find venue to be proper “when a defendant
had a regular and established place of business in a district, and the
plaintiff initiated the action within a reasonable time after the place
of business was closed.”285
3. Eleventh Circuit
In finding venue to be proper in Omega Patents, LLC v.
CalAmp Corp., Judge Paul G. Byron of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida held “that venue must be

283

CHISUM, supra note 10, § 21.02(2)(g).
See Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Water Techs., LLC, No. 2:17-CV-00068-JAW,
2017 WL 5895127, at *4 (D. Me. Nov. 29, 2017).
285
See Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v. OKI Data Ams., Inc., Nos. 12-6797, 12-6799,
12-6800, 12-6806, 2018 WL 1035793, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018).
284
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determined at the time the action is filed and not at some future
date in the proceedings.”286
The decisions on motions referenced above providing an
affirmative rule held that the proper date of the venue analysis is
the filing of the complaint in one instance and the accrual of the
cause of action in another instance.287 Consequently, the date from
which the venue analysis occurs could use further clarification and
unification.
TABLE 6:
Filing of Complaint
1

Accrual of the Cause
of Action
1

Unclear Rule
1

C. Pendent Venue
In deciding whether to adjudicate patent infringement claims
pursuant to pendent venue,288 courts, as a general rule, refuse to
exercise pendent venue over patent infringement claims.289
Nevertheless, the two primary approaches to pendent venue are (1)
to give effect to specific venue provisions as controlling and
superseding the general venue provisions and (2) to allow courts to
determine the primary claim(s) in the suit and then apply the
corresponding venue statute.290
1. Fourth Circuit
Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin of the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina did not exercise pendent venue
over the patent infringement claims in Flexible Technologies, Inc.
v. SharkNinja Operating LLC because the claims for patent
286

See Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp., No. 6:13-CV-1950-Orl-40DCI, 2017
WL 4990654, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2017).
287
See supra notes 282–84.
288
Pendent venue is also known as supplemental jurisdiction.
289
Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc., No. H-17-3258, 2018 WL 1811354, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018).
290
See id.
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infringement were the principal claims, venue over which was
improper, and because venue over the other claims was also
improper.291
2. Fifth Circuit
In Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc., Judge Lee H.
Rosenthal of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas faced the issue of pendent venue in the instant
case, in which the plaintiff amended its complaint to add claims for
trademark infringement following a request from the court for a
supplemental briefing on venue.292 The court ultimately found
pendent venue to be improper, as the primary claim in the instant
case was for patent infringement.293
3. Eleventh Circuit
Because the parties stipulated to venue in the district with
respect to one patent, and the other patents shared with it “a
common nucleus of fact,” Judge Paul G. Byron of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida found
pendent venue to be proper in Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp
Corp.294
The decisions on motions referenced above found pendent
venue to be improper in two cases and proper in one case.295 The
sample size here is small, but the two approaches governing
pendent venue in patent litigation are well-developed.

291

See Flexible Techs., Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating LLC, No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC,
2018 WL 1175043, at *7–8 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2018) adopted by No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC,
2018 WL 1158425 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018).
292
Wet Sounds, 2018 WL 1811354, at *3.
293
See id.
294
See Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp., No. 6:13-CV-1950-Orl-40DCI, 2017
WL 4990654, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2017).
295
See supra notes 289–92.
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TABLE 7:
Pendent Venue Improper –
Primary Claim Rule
2

Pendent Venue Proper –
Common Nucleus Rule
1

D. Agency Relationships
Courts generally apply a corporate separateness test, which is
satisfied if “corporate formalities are ignored” and there exists an
alter ego relationship between the corporate entities, in suits for
patent infringement when determining if proper venue as to a
corporate relative can be imputed to the corporate defendant.296
1. Third Circuit
Judge Andrews of the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware found in T-Jat Systems 2006, Ltd. v. Expedia,
Inc. (DE) that the defendant could not be found to have a regular
and established place of business in the jurisdiction on the basis
that the principal of the defendant resided in the district and
therefore granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper
venue.297
2. Fourth Circuit
Judge Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the
assertion by the plaintiff that venue was proper as to one of the
defendants in Infinity Computer Products, Inc. v. OKI Data
Americas, Inc. because venue may have been proper with respect
to one of the defendant’s wholly owned subsidiaries.298

296

See, e.g., Soverain IP, LLC v. AT&T Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00293-RWS, 2017 WL
6452802, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017); Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. Gen. Mills,
Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2471 SNLJ, 2017 WL 4865936, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2017).
297
See T-Jat Sys. 2006, Ltd. v. Expedia, Inc. (DE), No. 16-581-RGA, 2018 WL
1525496, at *7–8 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2018).
298
See Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v. OKI Data Ams., Inc., Nos. 12-6797, 12-6799,
12-6800, 12-6806, 2018 WL 1035793, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018).
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Because of the corporate separateness between the defendant
and Lego Brand Retail in Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego
Systems, Inc., Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the
stores of Lego Brand Retail in the district could not be imputed to
the defendant to establish a regular and established place of
business in the district.299
3. Fifth Circuit
In considering whether venue was proper in Soverain IP, LLC
v. AT&T Inc., Judge Robert W. Schroeder III of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reasoned that
proper venue as to a subsidiary cannot be imputed to the parent,
unless the corporate relatives act as a single unit, and consequently
held venue to be improper as to the corporate parent.300
In Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Digital, LLC, because the
defendant and its corporate parent maintained their corporate
separateness, Magistrate Judge John D. Love of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that venue
considerations of the parent could not be imputed to the
defendant.301
4. Eighth Circuit
While a corporate relative of the defendants maintained a
physical place in the district in Post Consumer Brands, LLC v.
General Mills, Inc., Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri declined
to impute such physical place to the defendants because of the
corporate separateness of the relevant entities.302

299

See Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 933 (E.D.
Va. 2017).
300
See Soverain IP, 2017 WL 6452802, at *1–2.
301
See Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Dig., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS-JDL, 2017 WL
3263871, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 28, 2017), adopted by sub nom. Blue Spike, LLC v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS, 2017 WL 4129321 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017).
302
See Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2471 SNLJ, 2017
WL 4865936, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2017).
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5. District of Columbia Circuit
In Tower Laboratories, Ltd. v. Lush Cosmetics Ltd., Judge
James E. Boasberg of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that suit
could be sustained against a corporate family in the district on the
basis of the operation of a store by one member of the corporate
family in the district.303
The decisions on the seven motions referenced above all found
venue on the basis of another corporate relative to be improper
with respect to the defendant(s).304 Though the motion outcomes
are one-sided, the corporate separateness test is uniformly applied.
TABLE 8:
Venue on the Basis of Agency
Relationship Improper
7

Venue on the Basis of Agency
Relationship Proper
0

E. Burden of Proof in Motions to Dismiss or Transfer on the Basis
of Improper Venue
With respect to the burden of proof as to proper venue, there
was a significant diversion among the courts as to whether the
plaintiff or the defendant bears the burden of proof in a venue
challenge.305
Of the seventy-two decisions on motions referenced above, ten
decisions placed the burden of proof on the defendant, evidenced
either explicitly or through decisional language, five of which
granted the instant motion and five of which denied the instant
motion306; twenty-five decisions placed the burden of proof on the
303

See Tower Labs., Ltd. v. Lush Cosmetics Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 3d 321, 324–25 (D.D.C.
2018).
304
See discussion supra notes 295–301.
305
See Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-01076-M, 2017
WL 6505793, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2017).
306
See Wet Sounds, Inc. v. Powerbass USA, Inc., No. H-17-3258, 2018 WL 1811354,
at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018); Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd, No. 17-3387 (ES)
(MAH), 2018 WL 1135334, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018); Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v.
OKI Data Ams., Inc., Nos. 12-6797, 12-6799, 12-6800, 12-6806, 2018 WL 1035793, at
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plaintiff, evidenced either explicitly or through decisional
language, twenty-four of which granted the instant motion and one
of which denied the instant motion307; and thirty-seven decisions

*3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00174-JRG,
slip op. at 2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2017); Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No.
2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017 WL 5630023, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017); Am. GNC
Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17-CV-00620-ALM-KPJ, 2017 WL 5157700, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 7, 2017); Post Consumer Brands, 2017 WL 4865936, at *1; Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 11,
2017); Snyders Heart Valve LLC v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00812-ALMKPJ, 2017 WL 4563076, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2017), adopted by No. 4:16CV812,
2017 WL 4552517 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2017); Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 269 F.
Supp. 3d 229, 237 (D. Del. 2017).
307
See RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Indus., Inc., No. 16-CV-01762-CMA-KMT, 2018 WL
1566839, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2018); Hildebrand v. Wilmar Corp., No. 17-CV02821-PAB-MEH, 2018 WL 1535505, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2018), adopted by No.
17-CV-02821-PAB-MEH, 2018 WL 4356789 (D. Colo. Sept. 13, 2018); Peerless
Network, Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, No. 17-CV-1725 (JPO), 2018 WL
1478047, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2018); Flexible Techs., Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating
LLC, No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC, 2018 WL 1175043, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2018)
adopted by No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC, 2018 WL 1158425 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018);
Realtime Data LLC v. Nexenta Sys., Inc., CV 2:17–07690 SJO (JCx), 2018 WL
2724776, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018); Tower Labs., 285 F. Supp. 3d at 323; RAH
Color Techs., LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., No. 17 C 4931, 2018 WL 439210, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 16, 2018); Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Int’l, Inc.,
No. 5:14-CV-2022, 2018 WL 400326, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018); Fox Factory, Inc.
v. SRAM, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-00506-WHO, 2018 WL 317839, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8,
2018); Reflection, LLC v. Spire Collective LLC, No. 17CV1603-GPC(BGS), 2018 WL
310184, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018); Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co., No. C175067RBL, 2017 WL 6034222, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 6, 2017); Personal Audio, LLC v.
Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 922, 924 (E.D. Tex. 2017); Nike, Inc. v. Skechers U.S.A.,
Inc., No. 3:16-CV-007-PK, 2017 WL 7275389, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2017); Precision
Fabrics Grp., Inc. v. Tietex Int’l, Ltd., Nos. 1:13-CV-645, 1:14-CV-650, 2017 WL
5176355, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2017); Niazi v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., Nos. 17-CV183-jdp, 17-CV-184-jdp, 17-CV-185-jdp, 17-CV-283-jdp, 2017 WL 5159784, at *2–3
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2017); BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing Med., Inc., No. 17
C 5636, 2017 WL 5146008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017); Jinni Tech Ltd. v. Red.com,
Inc., No. C17-0217JLR, 2017 WL 4758761, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2017); Regents
of the Univ. of Minn. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-06056-JCS, slip op. at 10 (D.
Minn. Oct. 20, 2017); CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Light Efficient Design, No. 4:16-CV-00482DCN, 2017 WL 4556717, at *2 (D. Idaho Oct. 11, 2017); JPW Indus., Inc., v. Olympia
Tools Int’l, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-03153-JPM). 2017 WL 4512501, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct.
10, 2017); Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 925
(E.D. Va. 2017); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Ranir, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-185, 2017 WL
3537197, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2017); Prolacta Bioscience, Inc. v. Ni-Q, LLC, No.
CV 17-04071 SJO (Ex), 2017 WL 5664985, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017); Stuebing
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failed to clearly indicate the party upon which the burden of proof
was placed, twenty and a half of which granted the instant motion
and sixteen and a half of which denied the instant motion.308
Automatic Mach. Co. v. Gavronsky, No. 1:16-CV-576, 2017 WL 3187049, at *3 (S.D.
Ohio June 12, 2017); Galderma Labs., 2017 WL 6505793, at *3.
308
See Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Hantover, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-406, 2018 WL 1942179
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2018); T-Jat Sys. 2006, Ltd. v. Expedia, Inc. (DE), No. 16-581RGA, 2018 WL 1525496 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2018); Nat’l Prods. Inc. v. Arkon Res. Inc.,
Nos. C15-1984JLR, C15-1985JLR, C15-2024JLR, C16-0109JLR, 2018 WL 1457254
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2018); ParkerVision, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01477BJD-JRK (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2018); Mya Saray, LLC v. Dabes, No. 3:17CV00016, 2018
WL 1161145 (W.D. Va. Mar. 5, 2018); SportPet Designs Inc. v. Cat1st Corp., No. 17CV-0554, 2018 WL 1157925 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 2018); Cutsforth, Inc. v. LEMM
Liquidating Co., LLC, No. 12-1200 (SRN/LIB), 2018 WL 847763 (D. Minn. Feb. 13,
2018); Allsop, Inc. v. Ambient Lighting, Inc., No. C17-549 RAJ, 2018 WL 828225
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2018); Nichia Corp. v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-01453-JRG (E.D.
Tex. Feb. 2, 2018); Agri-Labs Holding LLC v. Taplogic, LLC, No. 1:15-CV-26-TLS,
2018 WL 437560 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2018); BASF Corp. v. SNF Holding Co., No. 4:14CV-2733, 2017 WL 7790618 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2017); 3G Licensing, S.A., v. HTC
Corp., No. 17-83-LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 6442101 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2017); Soverain IP,
LLC v. AT&T Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00293-RWS, 2017 WL 6452802 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18,
2017); GEODynamics, Inc. v. DynaEnergetics US, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00371-RSP, 2017
WL 6452803 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017); KAIST IP US LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No.
2:16-CV-01314-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 7058227 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017) adopted by No.
2:16-CV-01314-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 2731932 (E.D. Tex. June 6, 2018); Plexxikon Inc.
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 17-CV-04405-HSG, 2017 WL 6389674 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7,
2017); Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., No. 2:15CV21, 2017 WL 6034504 (E.D.
Va. Dec. 4, 2017); Presby Patent Tr. v. Infiltrator Water Techs., LLC, No. 2:17-CV00068-JAW, 2017 WL 5895127 (D. Me. Nov. 29, 2017); Treehouse Avatar LLC v.
Valve Corp., No. 15-427-JFB-SRF, 2017 WL 5564153 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 2017) adopted
by No. 1:15CV427, 2017 WL 6210506 (D. Del. Dec. 8, 2017); Lites Out, LLC v.
OutdoorLink, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00192, 2017 WL 5068348 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017);
Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., No. 17-23060-Civ-Scola, 2017 WL
5032989 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017); IPS Grp., Inc. v. CivicSmart, Inc., No. 17-CV-0632CAB (MDD), 2017 WL 4810099 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017); Red.com, Inc. v. Jinni Tech
Ltd., No. SACV 17-00382-CJC(KESx), 2017 WL 4877414 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017);
XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-03848-RS, 2017 WL 4551519
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017); InsideSales.com, Inc. v. SalesLoft, Inc., No. 2:16CV859DAK,
2017 WL 4280386 (D. Utah Sept. 26, 2017); Talsk Research, Inc. v. Evernote Corp., No.
16-CV-2167, 2017 WL 4269004 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017); Omega Patents, LLC v.
CalAmp Corp., No. 6:13-CV-1950-Orl-40DCI, 2017 WL 4990654 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
2017); Telebrands Corp. v. Ill. Indus. Tool, Inc.,, No. 17-3411 (JLL), 2017 WL 4157533
(D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2017); Nautilus, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. C16-5393RBL, 2017 WL 5952375 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2017); Cellular Dynamics Int’l, Inc. v.
Lonza Walkersville, Inc., No. 17-CV-0027-slc, 2017 WL 4046348 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 12,
2017); Townsend v. Brooks Sports, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-62-FtM-38MRM, 2017 WL
6417328 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2017); Eyetalk365, LLC v. Skybell Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-
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TABLE 9:
Motion Granted
Plaintiff: 24

Defendant: 5 Unclear:
20.5

Motion Denied
Plaintiff: 1

Defendant: 5 Unclear:
16.5

IV. MODERN TRENDS IN PATENT VENUE LAW
In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in VE Holding and holding that Fourco
“definitively and unambiguously held that the word ‘reside[nce]’
in § 1400(b) has a particular meaning as applied to domestic
corporations[, in that i]t refers only to the State of Incorporation,”
the U.S. Supreme Court unified the application of law as to the
first prong of the patent venue statute.309 However, the resolution
of the meaning of the first prong of the patent venue statute in TC
Heartland has led to a revival of litigation surrounding the second
prong of the patent venue statute, which is an area of law that is
uncertain and unsettled.310
After 1990, litigants rarely debated § 1400(b) because the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a corporate
patent defendant “resides” anywhere it is subject to personal
jurisdiction, VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917
F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990), rendering the venue question
redundant. But in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017), the Supreme Court
overruled VE Holding, concluding that “a domestic corporation
CV-00702-FDW-DCK, 2017 WL 3669548 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2017); Simpson
Performance Prods., Inc. v. NecksGen, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-00153-RLV-DCK, 2017 WL
3616764 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2017); Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Plastic Dev. Grp., LLC, No.
3:16-CV-63, 2017 WL 3479504 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2017); Gillespie v. Prestige Royal
Liquors Corp., No. 4:16-CV-02392-HSG., 2017 WL 3232462 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2017);
Blue Spike, LLC v. Nook Dig., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-1361-RWS-JDL, 2017 WL 3263871
(E.D. Tex. July 28, 2017), adopted by sub nom. Blue Spike, LLC v. Caterpillar, Inc., No.
6:16-CV-1361-RWS, 2017 WL 4129321 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017); Diem LLC v.
BigCommerce, Inc., No. 6:17-CV-00186, 2017 WL 3187473 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2017).
309
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017).
310
See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) (2012).
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‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the
patent venue statute.” With a much narrower interpretation of the
first half of § 1400(b) now established by the Supreme Court, it
was inevitable that challenges to venue would become more
frequent and require courts to consider anew whether the
requirements of the second half of the provision are satisfied in a
particular case.311
Much of the ambiguity resulting from the TC Heartland
decision has been resolved.312 Of course, TC Heartland resolved
the issue of the meaning of “residence” pursuant to the first prong
of the patent venue statute, with respect to domestic corporate
defendants; therefore, the disparity in decisions on motions, with
findings of proper residence in five cases and lack of proper
residence in two cases, should be coming to an equalization.313
With respect to the “regular and established place of business”
element of the second prong of the patent venue statute, the
guidance from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re
Cray served to effectively outline the requirements for such;
however, the decisions on motions found a lack of a regular and
established place of business in twenty-six cases and satisfaction of
such in only six cases. This disparity will also likely be equalized
as the effects of the In re Cray decision come to fruition and the
cases that were pending prior to TC Heartland and purportedly in
the proper venue pursuant to the prior residence standard but later
analyzed pursuant to the second prong of the statute are dismissed
or transferred to a proper venue.314
The means for satisfying the “acts of infringement”
requirement, also pursuant to the second prong of the patent venue
statute, is definitively described in 35 U.S.C. § 271, although some
latent uncertainties are apparent in cases dealing with the HatchWaxman Act. The disparity in the decisions, with four decisions
finding a lack of acts of infringement in the district and nine

311

See, e.g., Niazi v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., Nos. 17-CV-183-jdp, 17-CV-184-jdp,
17-CV-185-jdp, 17-CV-283-jdp, 2017 WL 5159784, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2017).
312
See id. at *2.
313
See supra note 68; see generally TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. 1514.
314
See supra note 155; see generally In re Cray, 871 F.3d 1355.
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decisions finding acts of infringement in the district, will steady as
the actions that were filed under the now incorrect residence
standard and then analyzed pursuant to the requirements of having
a regular and established place of business and having committed
acts of infringement in the district are dismissed or transferred to
the proper venue.315
Additionally, In re Micron addressed the issue of if and when
the venue defense is waived or forfeited; while sixteen decisions
found no waiver or forfeiture and seven decisions found waiver or
forfeiture, the guidance from the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has set forth a definite standard for evaluating waiver under
TC Heartland and left the forfeiture evaluation largely to the
discretion of the district courts.316
The analysis with respect to the relevant date for the venue
inquiry and pendent venue are issues that arose much less
frequently than the issues referenced above.317 Also, the decisions
with respect to agency relationships and foreign defendants were
unanimous in finding venue to be improper and proper,
respectively.318
Therefore, the remaining issue to be clarified by the courts was
the burden of proof inquiry.319 The decisions as to where to place
the burden in a venue challenge were significantly disparate among
the courts following TC Heartland.320 The burden was placed on
the defendant in ten decisions on motions, five of which were
granted and five of which were denied. On the other hand, the
burden was placed on the plaintiff in twenty-five decisions on
motions, twenty-four of which were granted and one of which was
denied. The placement of the burden was unclear in thirty-seven
315

See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012); see also Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd., No. 173387 (ES) (MAH), 2018 WL 1135334 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018); Galderma Labs., L.P. v.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-01076-M, 2017 WL 6505793 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17,
2017); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL
3980155 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017); supra note 218.
316
See supra note 280; see generally In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
317
See discussion supra notes 285, 293.
318
See discussion supra notes 161, 302.
319
See discussion supra notes 304–06.
320
See Galderma Labs., 2017 WL 6505793, at *3.
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decisions on motions, twenty-and-a-half of which were granted
and sixteen–and-a-half of which were denied.321
Although the placement of the burden on the defendant
resulted in the same number of motions granted and denied, the
placement of the burden on the plaintiff resulted in almost
unanimous granting of the motions, and the lack of clarity as to the
application of the burden in thirty-seven motions was problematic
in itself.322 Therefore, a sensible solution to this problem would be
to uniformly apply the law of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to this issue, as, “[i]n matters unique to patent law, this
court applies its own law. Section 1400(b) is unique to patent law,
and ‘constitute[s] “the exclusive provision controlling venue in
patent infringement proceedings”. . . .’ Thus, Federal Circuit law,
rather than regional circuit law, governs our analysis of
what § 1400(b) requires.”323 Additionally, given the data on the
application of the burden of proof in the decisions on motions on
the basis of improper venue to this point, it seems that placing the
burden on the plaintiff results in inordinately skewed results,
failing to apply a burden clearly is not a valid option, and that
placing the burden on the defendant results in the most even,
uniform, and equal outcomes.324 Therefore, the best option for
proceeding with this facet of the law would likely be to place the
burden of proof in a venue challenge on the defendant in a uniform
manner throughout the United States.325
In response to this need for clarification and unification and
through a petition for a writ of mandamus by ZTE (USA) Inc.,326
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently requested
additional briefing on the following issues: “(1) Does Federal
Circuit or regional circuit law apply to the question of who bears
the burden of proof on a challenge to venue under 28 U.S.C. §

321

See supra notes 304–06. Note that some decisions were granted-in-part and deniedin-part.
322
See supra notes 304–06.
323
In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
324
See supra notes 304–06.
325
See supra notes 304–06.
326
See generally Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re ZTE (USA) Inc., No. 18-00113
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 2017).
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1406 in a patent case? (2) On this question, which party bears the
burden of proof?”327 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
answered the first question by holding that the Federal Circuit law
governs the establishment of proper venue in a patent infringement
action and the associated burdens, and the court responded to the
second question by holding for the first time that, in cases in which
the defendant challenges venue in a patent infringement action, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper,
reasoning that this placement of the burden comports with the
narrowness of the applicable statute.328
The one case in which the court placed the burden of
establishing proper venue on the plaintiff and also denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss (or transfer) on the basis of
improper venue was RAH Color Technologies, LLC v.
Quad/Graphics, Inc.329 In reasoning as to why the defendant failed
in its venue challenge, the court emphasized that the burden on the
plaintiff is “low” and reiterated multiple times that factual disputes
must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff at this stage.330
Therefore, while the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
decision in In re ZTE (USA) Inc. should cause plaintiffs to be
weary of a venue challenge in light of the narrowing construction
of proper venue in a patent infringement action and the placement
of the burden on the plaintiff in such a challenge, jurisdictionspecific, plaintiff-friendly jurisprudence on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(3) generally may provide a refuge for patent
owner plaintiffs in an age of stringent constructions of patent
venue requirements.
CONCLUSION
The TC Heartland decision has overhauled the prior
framework for proper venue in patent litigation, specifically as to

327

See In re ZTE (USA) Inc., No. 18-00113, slip op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 20, 2018).
See In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008, 1012–14 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
329
See RAH Color Techs., LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., No. 17-C-4931, 2018 WL
439210, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2018).
330
See id. at *1–3.
328
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where a corporate defendant is deemed to reside.331 This change in
the interpretation of “residence” in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) has led to
a reexamination of the law of regular and established places of
business, acts of infringement, and the rules governing foreign
defendants. Additionally, the issues of waiver and forfeiture of the
venue objection, the appropriate date of the venue analysis,
pendent venue, the impact of agency relationships on the proper
venue determination, and the proper placement of the burden of
proof in venue challenges have been revived and, in some
instances, clarified. However, the placement of the burden of proof
in venue challenges is the strongest indicator of motion outcomes
concerning venue in patent litigation. Placement of the burden on
the defendants results in the most equitable and consistent
outcomes, so, in light of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit’s holdings in In re ZTE (USA) Inc., plaintiffs should (1) be
cautious to file patent infringement actions in order to conform
with the narrowing construction of proper patent venue and (2)
evaluate the disputed jurisdiction’s jurisprudence with respect to its
treatment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) motions
generally in order to determine potential susceptibility to a venue
challenge.

331

See generally McDole et al., supra note 8.

